Privacy policy for BrowserSync - Self-Hosted
BrowserSync - Self-Hosted by Axel Roman
Privacy policy for BrowserSync - Self-Hosted
This is a small, informal, self-hosted service, not a commercial product. This
document explains, in plain language, what happens to your data if you use it. If
anything here is unclear, ask whoever gave you the server URL.
- Your email address and a password hash (not your actual password — it's run
through a one-way hashing algorithm, argon2id, before it's ever stored). - A hash of your recovery passphrase (not the passphrase itself — same one-way
hashing, and derived through a completely separate calculation from the one that
actually protects your data, so this hash can't be used to decrypt anything). It only
exists so the server can confirm "yes, that's the right recovery passphrase" if you
ever need to reset a forgotten password. - Your wrapped data key: the actual key that encrypts your bookmarks/history isn't
your passphrase or your password — it's a random key, generated on your device, that
gets locked inside an encrypted "envelope" using a key derived from your passphrase.
That envelope is what's stored here. It's safe to store: opening it requires your
passphrase, which the server never learns. - Encrypted blobs of your bookmarks, (if you turn it on) browsing history, and
any passwords you save in the extension's password vault, encrypted on your own device with that data key before they're ever sent anywhere. - Timestamps of when you last synced, and the rough size of each encrypted blob.
- If you're logged in on more than one device, one row per device recording when it
last used its login session — this is what lets you log out a single lost/old device
without logging out everywhere.
- The actual content of your bookmarks or history, in readable form. What reaches
the server is ciphertext — meaningless without the data key described above. Nobody
can read your bookmark titles, URLs, or browsing history from the server or its
database — not a hacker who steals the database, and not the admin (see below). - Your password, in any readable form.
- Your recovery passphrase, in any readable or reversible form.
- A second copy of your data key, wrapped with your password, exists too — but only on
each of your own devices (in the extension's local storage), never on the server.
That's what lets your password unlock BrowserSync day-to-day without the server ever
being able to do the same. - The passwords your browser itself saves, or its autofill data. BrowserSync can't read
those; it only keeps the passwords you save in its own vault (encrypted, see above).
If you turn on in-page suggestions, the extension reads a login form's username and
password when you submit it, only to offer saving them — they stay on your device
unless you click Save, and are then encrypted before upload like everything else.
Whoever runs this server (technically) has normal database access — that's unavoidable
for anyone self-hosting a service. Concretely, that means the admin:
- Can see: that an account with your email exists, roughly how large your synced
data is, and when you last synced. - Cannot see: your bookmarks, your browsing history, or anything else inside your
encrypted blobs — including with direct access to the database. The admin does see
your plaintext password at the moment you log in (any password-based login works this
way), but that alone isn't enough to decrypt your data: the password-wrapped copy of
your data key lives only on your own devices, never on the server. This is "end-to-end
encryption": the server is just relaying ciphertext (and an envelope only your
passphrase can open) that it can't read on its own.
This also means: if you lose both your password and your recovery passphrase, your
synced data cannot be recovered by anyone, including the admin. There is no "reset
passphrase" option, by design — a recovery path for the passphrase itself would mean
someone other than you could decrypt your data.
The database (including your account, encrypted blobs, and hashed credentials) is
backed up regularly. A backup contains the same information as the live database — it
does not expose your bookmark/history content in plaintext either, since the blobs are
already encrypted before they're stored.
- Backup frequency: [admin: fill in, e.g. "daily at 3am"]
- Retention: [admin: fill in, e.g. "last 14 daily backups kept"]
- Where backups are stored: [admin: fill in, e.g. "on the same homelab NAS,
separate disk from the live database"]
You can delete your account and all data associated with it at any time, from your
server's account page (
https://<your-server>/dashboard/) → "Delete my account" - theextension links to it from Settings → "More settings" → Danger zone → "Open account page". This
immediately and permanently deletes your user record and every encrypted blob tied to
your account from the server (via
DELETE /api/auth/account) — it cannot be undone,and there's no way for the admin to recover it afterward either.
This is a best-effort personal project, not a commercial service:
- There is no SLA. The server can go down for maintenance, a homelab power outage, an
ISP issue, or any other reason, without notice. - There is no dedicated support line — this is a service run informally, not a hosted
product with a support team behind it.
- Planned duration: [admin: fill in, e.g. "at least through 2027" — set
expectations so people don't treat this as permanent infrastructure] - Questions or concerns: [admin: fill in your contact — email, Matrix/Discord
handle, etc.]